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Workplace Sexual Harassment and the 
“Unwelcome” Requirement: An Analysis of 
BC Human Rights Tribunal Decisions from 
2010 to 2016
Bethany Hastie
Dans la foulée du mouvement #moiaussi et d’un certain nombre de cas très média­
tisés au Canada, il était possible de penser que les tribunaux reçoivent de plus en 
plus de plaintes de harcèlement sexuel au travail. Pourtant, il existe actuellement peu 
d’analyses des lois relatives au harcèlement sexuel au Canada. L’auteure du présent 
article offre ici sa contribution en analysant des décisions du Tribunal des droits de 
la personne de la Colombie­Britannique de 2010 à 2016. Elle y analyse les tendances 
dans l’évaluation de la crédibilité et de la nature des plaintes de harcèlement sexuel 
et démontre que le fait que la plaignante doive prouver que la conduite en question 
était « importune » dirige de façon inappropriée le centre de l’enquête juridique vers 
son propre comportement. En s’appuyant sur des questions bien documentées con­
cernant les mythes et les stéréotypes genrés dans le contexte de l’agression sexuelle, 
cet article démontre que l’exigence de prouver que la conduite était « importune » 
introduit des problèmes semblables dans les plaintes de harcèlement sexuel.
Legal complaints concerning workplace sexual harassment are anticipated to increase, 
following in the wake of the #MeToo movement and a number of high­profile cases in 
Canada. Yet little contemporary research has analyzed  sexual harassment laws in Can­
ada. This article contributes to further research on sexual harassment laws through a 
case analysis of BC Human Rights  Tribunal decisions from 2010 to 2016. This article 
analyzes trends in assessing credibility and character in sexual harassment complaints 
and establishes that the requirement that a complainant prove that the conduct in ques­
tion was “ unwelcome” improperly shifts the focus of the legal inquiry towards her 
own behaviour. Drawing on well­documented issues concerning gendered myths and 
 stereotypes in the sexual assault context, this article demonstrates that similar problems 
are introduced in sexual harassment complaints through the “unwelcome” requirement.
 I wish to thank Isabel Grant and the anonymous reviewers for the Canadian Journal of Women 
and the Law for their helpful comments and feedback on the draft of this article. I would also 
like to acknowledge the research assistance of Hayden Cook in preparing this article and 




The #MeToo movement has sparked renewed attention to the issue of sexual harass-
ment. In the Canadian legal context, sexual harassment complaints, particularly 
in the non-unionized workplace, are likely to be pursued through a human rights 
 tribunal.
1
 Recent evidence from Ontario suggests that the volume of such claims 
may be increasing due to the benefits associated with human rights tribunals as a 
remedial vehicle over civil courts, including relaxed evidentiary and examination 
standards, a less adversarial atmosphere, and higher compensatory awards.
2
 Yet little 
research has examined how sexual harassment law is currently understood, inter-
preted, and applied by human rights tribunals in Canada.
3
This article is part of a larger project that takes up an examination of workplace 
sexual harassment complaints at the BC Human Rights Tribunal (BCHRT) from 
2010 to 2016. While an earlier article examined inherent limitations and enduring 
1. The recognition of sexual harassment as a form of employment discrimination has cre-
ated a direct pathway for claims under human rights law in Canada. In limited cases, if
the conduct is severe enough to constitute criminal harassment or sexual assault under the 
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 276(1)(a)–(b) [Criminal Code], criminal charges
may be laid. In addition, complainants could optionally pursue civil claims in tort or em-
ployment law where the discrimination or harassment relates to a recognized civil claim.
2. See Sean Fine, “Ontario Human Rights Tribunal Gains Steam as Alternative Route for
Sexual Assault Cases”, Globe and Mail (3 April 2018) <https://www.theglobeandmail.
com/canada/article-workplace-sexual-assault-survivors-claim-victory-at-human- 
rights/>. Note also that sexual harassment does not constitute an independent civil
action and, as such, could only be addressed through civil courts in the employment
context when it is ancillary to a recognized claim, such as wrongful dismissal. See also
Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H-19, s 46.1, which grants civil courts the ability
to award remedies where the Code has been infringed (s 46.1(1)), but prohibiting an
independent action for infringement under the Code through the courts (s 46.1(2)).
3. For existing scholarship on sexual harassment law in Canada, see e.g. Colleen  Sheppard, 
“Systemic Inequality and Workplace Culture: Challenging the  Institutionalization of
Sexual Harassment” (1995) 3 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 249;
Arjun P Aggarwal & Madhu M Gupta, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 3rd ed
(Toronto: Butterworths, 2000); Fay Faraday, “Dealing with Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: The Promise and Limitations of Human Rights Discourse” (1994) 32:1
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 32; Kathleen Gallivan, “Sexual Harassment after Janzen
v Platy: The Transformative Possibilities” (1991) 49 University of Toronto Faculty
of Law Review 27; Sandy Welsh, Myrna Dawson & Elizabeth Griffiths, Sexual
 Harassment Complaints to the Canadian Human Rights Commission (Ottawa: Status
of Women Canada, 1999) <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/SW21-43-
1999E-5.pdf>; Susan M Hart, “Labour Arbitration of Co-Worker Sexual Harassment
Cases in Canada” (2012) 29:2 Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 268;
Sheryl L Johnson, Sexual Harassment in Canada: A Guide for Understanding and
Prevention (Toronto: Lexis Nexis Canada, 2017).
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problems attending the identification of sexually harassing conduct,
4
 this article 
focuses on problematic trends in assessing credibility, character, and consent in 
 sexual harassment complaints. Given the increasingly documented issues attending 
victims of sexual offences and gender-based violence in the criminal justice system,
5
 
there is good reason for concern that similar issues may plague complainants of 
 sexual harassment within human rights tribunal proceedings.
Victims of sexual offences are known to face substantial barriers pursuing justice 
in the criminal justice system, especially concerning issues in assessing credibility and 
character. Problematic myths concerning women’s sexual availability, narrow and even 
false understandings of how women should respond to sexual violence, and underlying 
tendencies to responsibilize or blame women for the violence perpetrated against them 
continue to impact negatively credibility and character for victims of sexual offences.
6
Sexual harassment, like sexual assault, will often occur in private and without cor-
roborating evidence. This means that cases may revolve substantially around the testi-
mony of the complainant and respondent, which makes credibility a significant factor 
in such cases. The documented impact that stereotypes and myths have in relation to a 
victim’s credibility in sexual assault cases,
7
 coupled with research that posits “people 
are more likely to rely on stereotypes when making judgements under conditions 
of uncertainty,” means that a lack of material or corroborating evidence may create 
conditions that enable the introduction and use of stereotypes in sexual harassment 
4. See Bethany Hastie, “Assessing Sexually Harassing Conduct in the Workplace: An
Analysis of BC Human Rights Tribunal Decisions 2010–2016” (2019) 31:2 Canadian
Journal of Women and the Law 293.
5. See e.g. Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: 
Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41:4 Akron Law Review 865
[Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”]; Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law,
Credibility, and ‘Ideal Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010)
22:2 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 397 [Randall, “Ideal Victims”]; Isabel
Grant, “Intimate Partner Harassment through a Lens of Responsibilization” (2015)
52:2 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 552; Elaine Craig, Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual As­
sault and the Failure of the Legal Profession (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2018) [Craig, Putting Trials on Trial]; Elaine Craig, “Section 276
Misconstrued: The Failure to Properly Interpret and Apply Canada’s Rape Shield Pro-
visions” (2016) 94:1 Canadian Bar Review 45 [Craig, “Section 276 Misconstrued”];
Lise Gotell, “When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual
History Evidence and the Disclosure of Personal Records” (2006) 43:3 Alberta Law
Review 743; Susan Ehrlich, “Perpetuating—and Resisting—Rape Myths in Trial Dis-
course,” in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice, and
Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 389.
6. See e.g. Randall, “Ideal Victims”, supra note 5; Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra
note 5; Ehrlich, supra note 5; Grant, supra note 5.
7. See e.g. Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”, supra note 5; Randall, “Ideal Vic-
tims,” supra note 5; Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra note 5; Ehrlich, supra note 5.
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complaints as a way to ‘explain’ complainant behaviour.
8
 This article demonstrates 
that these problems arise in the context of sexual harassment complaints in the human 
rights context, particularly in relation to the requirement that a complainant establish 
that conduct was “unwelcome” in order to substantiate her complaint.
The context in which the BCHRT operates makes this an appropriate jurisdiction 
for this pilot study. Based in one of only two jurisdictions in Canada without a Human 
Rights Commission during the period examined,
9
 the BCHRT has held independent 
responsibility for educating and informing itself on contemporary issues, such as 
workplace sexual harassment.
10
 The lack of a Human Rights Commission in British 
Columbia was claimed to have created a “gaping hole in the province’s system of 
human rights protection,” though existing research has not actually documented the 
impact this absence has had on the tribunal’s jurisprudence during the time period 
in question.
11
 As British Columbia moves ahead with its newly reinstated Human 
Rights Commission, and given the current attention to, and momentum of, the issue 
of workplace sexual harassment in public discourse, increased research and infor-
mation on the current status of the law and its interpretation and application at the 
BCHRT may be useful in directing the new Human Rights Commission’s work.
12
8. Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra note 5 at 206.
9. See Kaitlyn Matulewicz, “Law and the Construction of Institutionalized  Sexual
 Harassment in Restaurants” (2015) 30:3 Canadian Journal of Law and  Society 401
at 408 [Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual Harassment”]. British  Columbia
 reinstated its Human Rights Commission in 2019. Bill 50, Human Rights Code
Amendment Act, 2018, 3rd Sess, 41st Parl, BC, 2018 (assented to 27  November 2018),
SBC 2018, c 48 <https://www.leg.bc.ca/parliamentary-business/legislation-debates- 
proceedings/41st-parliament/3rd-session/bills/progress-of-bills>.
10. This might be contrasted with, for example, the Ontario Human Rights Commission
(OHRC), which has been particularly active in generating policy reports on workplace
sexual harassment. See e.g. OHRC, “Policy on Preventing Sexual and Gender-Based
Harassment” <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-preventing-sexual-and-gender-based- 
harassment-0>; OHRC, “OHRC Policy on Sexualized and Gender-Specific Dress
Codes” <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-policy-position-sexualized-and-gender-specific- 
dress-codes> [OHRC, “Policy on Dress Codes”].
11. Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual Harassment”, supra note 9 at 408, citing
Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, Strengthening Human Rights: Why British  Columbia
Needs a Human Rights Commission (Vancouver: Poverty and Human Rights  Centre
and  Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, December 2014) <https://www. 
policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/strengthening-human-rights>. Human Rights
Commissions in Canada have historically played a significant role in defining and
providing guidelines on sexual harassment. Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 12–13;
OHRC, “Policy on Dress Codes”, supra note 10.
12. Regarding the reinstatement of the BC Human Rights Commission, see Government of 
British Columbia, Office of the Premier, News Release, 15138, “B.C. to Fight Inequal-
ity and Discrimination with Renewed Human Rights Commission” (4 August 2017)
<https://news.gov.bc.ca/15138>.
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The case selection for this study is comprised of twenty complaints of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace, pursuant to section 13 of British Columbia’s Human Rights 
Code, from 2010 to 2016.
13
 These cases provide a contemporary picture of sexual 
harassment complaints and their adjudication at the BCHRT as well as a sample size 
suitable for in-depth qualitative analysis.
14
This article proceeds in three parts. The first section outlines and critiques the 
legal principles governing sexual harassment complaints in the human rights con-
text, focusing on the “unwelcome” requirement. The second section outlines and 
discusses the challenges facing sexual assault complainants regarding credibility 
and character assessments in the criminal justice system and the problematic myths 
and stereotypes commonly documented in that context. The third section engages 
in a qualitative analysis of identified cases at the BCHRT with a view to unpacking 
how problems similar to those discussed in relation to criminal law arise and impact 
cases of sexual harassment in the human rights context. This section analyzes and 
discusses how assumption-based reasoning and stereotypes unfold in workplace 
sexual harassment complaints in relation to: (1) a lack of protest as implicit con-
sent or “welcomeness”; (2) “risky” behaviour or participation as undermining the 
threshold for establishing conduct as “unwelcome”; and (3) challenges in evaluating 
harassment in intimate partner and other close relationships.
13. RSBC 1996, c 210; LaBelle v Campus Technologies and  Another, 2010 BCHRT 116
[LaBelle]; Ratzlaff v Marpaul Construction and Another, 2010 BCHRT 13 [Ratzlaff];
Tyler v Robnik and Mobility World (No 2), 2010 BCHRT 192 [Tyler]; Soroka v Dave's
Custom Metal Works and Others, 2010 BCHRT 239 [
 
Soroka]; Skorka v Happy Day 
Inn and Others, 2010 BCHRT 306 [Skorka]; Wideman v Wiebe and Another (No 2), 
2010 BCHRT 312 [Wideman]; Heyman v Saunders (No 2), 2010 BCHRT 88  [Heyman]; 
Kang v Hill and Another (No 2), 2011 BCHRT 154 [Kang]; Young and Young on behalf 
of Young v Petres, 2011 BCHRT 38 [Young]; McIntosh v Metro Aluminum Products 
and Another, 2011 BCHRT 34 [McIntosh]; Woods v Fluid Creations, 2012 BCHRT 110 
[Woods]; Q v Wild Log Homes and Another, 2012 BCHRT 135 [Q]; MacDonald v Na­
jafi and Another (No 2), 2013 BCHRT 13 [MacDonald]; Root v Ray Ray's Beach Club 
and Others, 2013 BCHRT 143 [Root]; Paananen v Scheller (No 2), 2013 BCHRT 257 
[Paananen]; Sleightholm v Metrin and Another (No 3), 2013 BCHRT 75  [Sleightholm]; 
Kuchta v J Lanes Enterprises and Others, 2013 BCHRT 88 [Kuchta]; Kafer v Sleep 
Country Canada and Another (No 2), 2013 BCHRT 289 [Kafer]; Balikama Obo Others 
v Khaira Enterprises and Others, 2014 BCHRT 107 [Balikama]; PN v FR and Another 
(No 2), 2015 BCHRT 60 [PN].
14. A longitudinal study on the evolution of the legal conceptualization of sexual harass-
ment, and the inclusion of cases dismissed in preliminary proceedings, would add
further depth to the findings of this article, as would a comparative study of several
provincial human rights tribunals. Although beyond the scope of this article, such stud-
ies are planned to follow. For a comparison of BC and Ontario case law from 2000 to
2018, see Bethany Hastie, Workplace Sexual Harassment: Assessing the Effectiveness
of Human Rights Law in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2019)
<https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs/500/>.
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Defining Sexual Harassment in Human Rights Law: A Critical 
Examination of the “Unwelcome” Requirement
Sexual harassment is defined broadly as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature 
that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related con-
sequences for the victim of the harassment.”
15
 Under this definition, a complainant 
must establish both the harassing conduct and the fact that such conduct was 
“ unwelcome.”
16
 The inclusion of the “unwelcome” requirement creates a context 
that invites scrutiny of the complainant’s own conduct and behaviour, creating space 
for problematic stereotypes and assumption-based reasoning like that documented in 
the context of sexual assault to improperly influence adjudication of the complaint.
17
The requirement that a complainant establish that the conduct in question is 
“unwelcome” is unique and not required in other human rights complaints.
18
 Tribunals and courts have come to understand the legal “test” for determining 
whether conduct is “unwelcome” as: “[T]aking into account all the circumstances, 
would a reasonable person know that the conduct in question was not welcomed 
by the complainant?”
19
 The test thus asks whether the harasser knew, or ought 
15. Janzen v Platy Enterprises, [1989] 1 SCR 1252 at 1284 [Janzen]. The conduct element 
of the definition was further elaborated upon in Mahmoodi v UBC and Dutton, 1999
BCHRT 56 [Mahmoodi].
16. This element may have been introduced to ensure that consensual sexual interactions
in the workplace were excluded from the legal concept of sexual harassment. See e.g.
Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 120–37, for an overview of this requirement and
its critiques. See also Janine Benedet, “Book Review of Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace by Aggarwal and Gupta” (2001) 39:4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 843 at 847 
[Benedet, “Book Review”] for a critique of their treatment of the issue and especially
of how this creates a heightened standard for establishing discrimination.
17. In addition to analogies with sexual assault literature, one identified article in existing
literature examined claims of sexual harassment within labour arbitration proceedings.
Hart found that the identified cases in that context were united by an “inadequate under-
standing of sexual harassment with a subtheme of victim blaming [and the] undermining 
[of] women’s credibility as witnesses through gendered arguments.” Hart, supra note
3 at 273. This further supports the need to examine whether, and to what extent, such
stereotypes and myths have a pervasive presence in the human rights tribunal context.
18. Under the BC Human Rights Code, supra note 13, the conduct in question does not
have to be intentional (s 2). Human rights complaints must generally establish three el-
ements: (1) that the complainant has a protected characteristic; (2) that the complainant 
has experienced adverse treatment; and (3) that the protected characteristic was a factor 
in the adverse treatment. Moore v British Columbia, 2012 SCC 61. For a commentary
on judicial and academic confusion around whether or not express protest is required
to establish unwelcomeness, potentially making it more difficult to establish a discrim-
ination claim, see Benedet, “Book Review”, supra note 16 at 846–47.
19. Mahmoodi, supra note 15 at para 140.
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to have known, that the conduct was not welcomed. Providing an objective basis 
for assessing “unwelcomeness” through the inclusion of “ought to have known” 
potentially expands the reach of how sexual harassment is defined in human rights 
law by eliminating a requirement to establish specific or actual intent on the part 
of the harasser.
Interpretations of the test for establishing “unwelcome” conduct further acknowl-
edge that a complainant is not required to expressly object to the conduct in question 
and that tolerating conduct does not equate to consent or acceptance.
20
 This interpre-
tation is significant as it reflects an understanding of sexual harassment as an abuse 
of power.
21
 Individuals subjected to sexual harassment will face several disincentives 
towards making a complaint or reporting the harassment. A complainant may toler-
ate or submit to “unwelcome” conduct due to the power differential between herself 
and her harasser, who may be, for example, a supervisor or person in a position of 
authority.
22
 A fear of job-related consequences may similarly act to delay a complaint, 
in addition to the social stigma often experienced by victims of sexual violence.
23
A Working Women’s Institute survey found that the “most common reasons given 
for not reporting the [sexual harassment] incidents were that they believed nothing 
would be done (52%), that it would be treated lightly or ridiculed (43%), or that they 
would be blamed or suffer repercussions (30%).”
24
 A complainant might otherwise 
attempt to engage in subtle forms of dissuasion, rather than alerting their co-workers 
or reporting the harassment to a supervisor, particularly in male-dominated work-
places or workplaces where sexualized conduct is normalized.
25
Despite the positive potential of doctrinal interpretations of the “unwelcome” 
requirement, its application in individual cases continues to place an inappropriate 
burden on complainants and looks disproportionately to their own behaviour and 
reaction to the respondent’s conduct in assessing complaints. While the “unwelcome” 
20. Ibid at paras 140–41.
21. Ibid at paras 136–37; Janzen, supra note 15. See also Matulewicz, “Institutionalized
Sexual Harassment”, supra note 9 at 403; Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 129.
22. Mahmoodi, supra note 15 at 141.
23. See Elaine Craig, “The Relevance of Delayed Disclosure to Complainant Credibility in 
Cases of Sexual Offence” (2011) 36:2 Queen’s Law Journal 551 at 557 [Craig, “Rele-
vance of Delayed Disclosure”].
24. Johnson, supra note 3 at 195.
25. Hesitance to report or file a complaint may be due to the various job-related conse-
quences a complainant perceived they might face. Hart, supra note 3 at 275; Craig,
“Relevance of Delayed Disclosure” at 557; Johnson, supra note 3 at 195. A com-
plainant’s behaviour may, at first glance, suggest tolerance of the impugned conduct.
Mahmoodi, supra note 15 at para 141, acknowledges that conduct may be tolerated
and yet unwelcome. Similarly, Johnson found that “generally, tribunals have great dif-
ficulty in accepting the survivor’s claim of harassment where he, she, or they continued 
to have social or cordial relations with the alleged harasser after the incident(s) of
harassment.” Johnson, supra note 3 at 198.
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requirement appears, on its face, to centralize the alleged harasser’s conduct, adju-
dicators may look to the complainant’s behaviour, examining whether, and to what 
extent, she participated in the conduct or demonstrated similar behaviour in the past, 
in assessing whether the conduct was “unwelcome.”
26
 In the American context, this 
has been critiqued as creating “a ‘trial of the victim,’ analogous to that which occurs 
in sexual assault cases[,]” leading to calls for the abolition of the “unwelcome” 
requirement in sexual harassment law.
27
Isabel Grant writes of similar problems arising under the legal definition of crim-
inal harassment in Canada. She notes that the text of this offence itself shifts scru-
tiny to the complainant and that its drafting and interpretation is “influenced by 
assumptions about how women should respond to male violence and how they are 
responsible for changing their lives in order to avoid it.”
28
 In particular, the criminal 
harassment offence requires that the Crown prove that the accused knew that their 
behaviour was harassing. In order to ascertain this, judges often ask whether the 
complainant communicated this fact.
29
As in the case of criminal harassment, the application of the “unwelcome” require-
ment in sexual harassment cases has been widely criticized for the reliance it places on 
assessing the complainant’s own conduct or behaviour, as well as the workplace atmo-
sphere, in determining whether the respondent knew, or ought to have known, that the 
conduct in question would be “unwelcome.”
30
 Thus, despite doctrinal  interpretations of 
the requirement that reject such an approach, in practice, the application of this element 
of sexual harassment complaints problematically operates to shift the focus of the legal 
inquiry from the harasser to the complainant herself.
31
 This undermines the purpose of 
the principles governing sexual harassment claims and human rights complaints more 
26. Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual Harassment”, supra note 9 at 403. See also
 Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 123–28 (discussion of various issues that arise
with respect to the “unwelcome” standard, the complainant’s character and consent).
27. Kathryn Abrams, “The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment” (1998) 83:5 Cornell 
Law Review 1169 at 1170, n 6, 1190. See also Susan Estrich, “Sex at Work” (1991)
43:4 Stanford Law Review 813 at 831.
28. Grant, supra note 5 at 553, 573.
29. Ibid at 576.
30. Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual Harassment”, supra note 9 at 403, citing
 Marlene Kadar, “Sexual Harassment: Where We Stand; Research and Policy” (1983)
3 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 358; Sandy Goundry, “Sexual Harassment in
the 
 
Employment Context: The Legal Management of Working Women’s  Experience” 
(1985) 43:1 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 1; Gallivan, supra note 3; 
Judy Fudge, “Rungs on the Labour Law Ladder: Using Gender to Challenge  Hierarchy” 
(1996) 60:2 Saskatchewan Law Review 237; Faraday, supra note 3; Colleen Sheppard, 
Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010). See also Aggarwal 
& Gupta, supra note 3 at 131.
31. For similar critiques in the American context, see e.g. Estrich, supra note 27 at 830.
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generally, which emphasize that a complainant’s apparent tolerance of, or acquies-
cence to, harassing conduct ought not to be understood as welcoming it.
32
The propensity to scrutinize a complainant’s own behaviour may further dis-
courage complainants of sexual harassment from pursuing a legal complaint. Sheryl 
Johnson asserts that many attribute their silence to “practical considerations,” and a 
mere “18% of the women in the Working Women’s Institute survey stated that they 
complained about the harassment.”
33
 In discussing an arbitral decision that illustrated 
these very problems, Susan Hart notes that the complainant in that case stated that 
she regretted filing a complaint and would counsel others to refrain “because the 
process ‘makes it seem like you are the person being investigated.’”
34
 This statement 
buttresses Johnson’s claim that the “fear of vicious attacks on their reputations during 
hearings discourages targeted persons from reporting and complaining about sexual 
harassment incidents.”
35
 For some, “the harassing questioning at the hearing [is] part 
and parcel of the harassment that humiliates and denigrates the targeted person.”
36
 
These disincentives towards launching a legal claim or reporting harassment again 
mirror some of the reasons why victims of sexual assault and violence are known not 
to approach police or file a formal complaint. As such, despite notable differences 
between the two phenomena and their location and treatment in law, many similarities 
persist, suggesting that further work and education must be done to properly contextu-
alize, understand, and address sexual harassment complaints under human rights law.
Issues with the “unwelcome” requirement have also been specifically raised in 
relation to sexualized work environments, such as the restaurant industry. The nor-
malization of sexualized or related behaviour in the workplace can problematically 
be taken as a neutral background for a sexual harassment claim, thus raising the 
threshold for complainants to establish that conduct in this context is “unwelcome.” 
This may operate to effectively require a complainant to actively protest, particularly 
if verbal harassment rather than physical touching, is involved. As Kaitlyn Matule-
wicz notes, “[w]hen a complaint of sexual harassment from a sexualised workplace 
is raised in a legal forum a complainant may be obligated to clearly object to the 
sexual remarks, jokes, banter, etc.—which may be the ‘norm’—to show the conduct 
in question was unwelcomed.”
37
 In other words, if a work environment normalizes 
32. This may have adverse consequences for a complainant’s legal case, similar to widely
established critiques concerning victim behaviour and consent in sexual assault cases
in the criminal justice system. See Christine Boyle, “Reasonable Doubt in Credibility
Contests: Sexual Assault and Sexual Equality” (2009) 13:4 International Journal of
Evidence and Proof 269.
33. Johnson, supra note 3 at 194.
34. Hart, supra note 3 at 274.
35. Johnson, supra note 3 at 195.
36. Ibid.
37. Kaitlyn Matulewicz, “Law’s Gendered Subtext: The Gender Order of Restaurant Work 
and Making Sexual Harassment Normal” (2016) 24:2 Feminist Legal Studies 127 at
128 [Matulewicz, “Law’s Gendered Subtext”].
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sexual banter or related conduct, more may be required of complainants in establish-
ing their claim, and active protest to such conduct may become an implicit require-
ment or proxy for establishing unwelcomeness in these contexts.
The legal “test” governing sexual harassment complaints and the “unwelcome” 
requirement facilitate an improper focus on the complainant’s own behaviour and 
character, opening the door for problematic myths and stereotypes to influence cred-
ibility assessments in this context. The next section will set out similar myths and 
stereotypes that negatively impact sexual assault cases in the criminal law context, 
before taking up a specific examination of whether, and to what extent, these myths 
and stereotypes have appeared in the BCHRT cases in the third section.
Credibility, Character, and Consent: Problematic 
Trends in Sexual Assault Trials
Issues concerning the enduring presence and negative impact of stereotypes and myths in 
assessing victim credibility in sexual assault cases are widely documented. The volume 
of research in this area provides an important foundation for considering whether, and 
to what extent, similar issues arise in the context of sexual harassment complaints under 
human rights tribunals. The overarching myth that persistently plagues victims in sexual 
assault cases is that of the “ideal victim” (although this is, itself, an accumulation of many 
gendered assumptions about victimhood). The “ideal victim” is, in short, a “responsi-
ble, security conscious, crime-preventing subject who acts to minimize her own sexual 
risk.”
38
 In other words, the “ideal victim” “diligently self-polic[es] [her] behaviour to 
avoid sexual dangers” and takes immediate action in the aftermath of assault.
39
The “ideal victim” myth presents specific iterations that cut across the literature 
on sexual assault cases and victim credibility issues. Some of the specific stereo-
types that fall within its ambit are the “hue and cry” stereotype (“real victims” will 
fight back or immediately cry for help), the “real rape” stereotype (sexual assaults 
are committed by a stranger on an unsuspecting victim), and the “party girl” 
 stereotype (“bad girls” are more likely to consent).
40
 Evidence of a complainant’s 
sexual history was also historically associated with the “twin myths” that a “pro-
miscuous” complainant was more likely to consent and less worthy of belief.
41
38. Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”, supra note 5 at 879. See also Randall,
“Ideal Victims”, supra note 5 at 407.
39. Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”, supra note 5 at 897.
40. For a discussion of the “hue and cry” and “party girl” myths, see Craig, Putting
 Trials on Trial, supra note 5 at 34, 37. For a discussion of the “real rape” stereotype,
see  Ehrlich, supra note 5 at 391, citing Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Cambridge, MA:
 Harvard University Press, 1987).
41. Using sexual history evidence in service of either of these myths is expressly prohib-
ited by the Criminal Code, supra note 1. See also Craig, “Section 276 Misconstrued”,
supra note 5 at 51.
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These stereotypes and myths result in the exclusion of less-than-ideal  victims and 
complainants from understandings of “victimhood” in sexual assault trials and 
cast suspicion on their credibility. Although changes to the law have barred the 
use and reliance on such myths and stereotypes in criminal sexual assault tri-
als,
42
 scholars continue to uncover and critique the ways in which these myths 
and stereotypes influence the trial process and judicial reasoning.
43
 These myths 
continue to negatively impact credibility and affect the way in which adjudicators 
understand consent.
Despite the change to an affirmative consent standard under law,
44
 scholarship 
has documented numerous problems concerning the application of this standard and 
the fact that adjudicators continue to rely on the above myths and improperly respon-
sibilize women for assault avoidance. For example, Rakhi Ruparelia notes that, in 
many cases, judges focus on evidence that there was no “no,” or, in other words, a 
lack of active protest, in assessing consent, despite the fact that affirmative consent 
precludes such considerations.
45
 Elaine Craig also documents serious issues with 
the application of affirmative consent, finding that problematic assumption-based 
reasoning “that acquits a man of sexual assault because a woman failed to suffi-
ciently fight back amounts to an institutionalized, state-supported shaming of the 
42. See e.g. R v Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668, which explicitly mentions that an accused’s
 Constitutional right to make full answer and defence does not allow for the use of harm-
ful stereotypes which, in turn, may violate a complainant’s Constitutional equality rights
(at para 90); Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 276(1)(a)–(b), s 273.1(1). Both of these
amendments, which respectively created the modern rape shield provisions and the defi-
nition of consent at Canadian law, were made in 1992 as part of An Act to Amend the
Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), SC 1992, c 38, s 275 (the abrogation of the recent com-
plaint doctrine, enacted in 1983 as part of the Criminal Law  Amendments Act, SC 1980-
81-82-83, c 125, s 19). See also Craig, “Relevance of Delayed  Disclosure”, supra note 23.
43. See e.g. Craig, “Relevance of Delayed Disclosure”, supra note 23 at 553; Randall,
“Ideal Victims”, supra note 5; Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra note 5; Lucinda
Vandervort, “Lawful Subversion of the Criminal Justice Process? Judicial, Prosecuto-
rial, and Police Discretion in Edmondson, Kindrat, and Brown” in Elizabeth Sheehy,
ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice, and Women’s Activism (Ottawa:
University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 111.
44. The Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), SC 1992, c 38, is the source of the
modern definition of consent. R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330 clarified that no defence of 
“implied consent” exists at Canadian law, further entrenching the notion that consent must 
be affirmatively expressed. There also exist critiques concerning the affirmative consent
standard, particularly that it is not appropriate for all complainants. See e.g. Isabel Grant & 
Janine Benedet, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental Disabili-
ties: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief” (2007) 52:2 McGill Law Journal 243; Isabel 
Grant & Janine Benedet, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental
Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues” (2007) 52:3 McGill Law Journal 515.
45. See Rakhi Ruparelia, “Does No ‘No’ Mean Reasonable Doubt? Assessing the Impact of




 Embedded in the reasoning and assessment of credibility in criminal 
cases that question a victim’s lack of resistance is the myth that “real rape” will be 
met with violent resistance by all “real victims.”
In the context of criminal harassment, Grant has similarly documented how devi-
ations from “ideal” or “real victim” behaviour can create problematic assumptions in 
judicial reasoning. For example, where a complainant does not alter their behaviour 
to avoid their alleged harasser or engages in conduct that is not consistent with 
demonstrating a fear for their own safety, the court may determine that the requisite 
elements of the offence are not established since those elements include establish-
ing that the complainant has a subjective fear for her safety.
47
 Past sexual history 
and “risky” behaviour continue to play a role in credibility assessment in sexual 
assault cases. As Lucinda Vandervort notes in discussing a case where the victim was 
intoxicated, the judge “repeatedly allowed questions and answers that put evidence 
before the jury that directly or indirectly invited speculation and made insinuations 
or offered conclusions about the significance of the personal and sexual history of 
the complainant for the matters in issue.”
48
 This kind of questioning implicitly places 
the victim on trial and invites scrutiny of her character based on the problematic 
“ideal victim” stereotypes noted earlier.
Myths concerning women’s sexual availability and consent create particular chal-
lenges in the context of intimate partner relationships.
49
 Challenges in the intimate 
partner context have historically been associated with the myth that women in such 
relationships are in a perpetual state of consent. This also bears links to the “real 
rape” stereotype that sexual offences are only committed by strangers on unsuspect-
ing victims, usually with a weapon involved.
50
 In the context of sexual assault, Craig 
discusses a 2005 case in which the judge erroneously admitted sexual history evidence 
on the basis that it established a “pattern of consenting.”
51
 This supports the stereotype 
that past consent permits an adverse inference of consent in the context of the alleged 
incident before the court. Similar issues in the context of intimate partner relationships 
are noted by Melanie Randall
52
 and by Grant in the criminal harassment context.
53
46. Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra note 5 at 205.
47. Grant, supra note 5 at 576, 580, citing R v Moyse, 2010 MBPC 21; R v W(J), 2010
ONCJ 194.
48. Vandervort, supra note 43 at 116.
49. See Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault in Spousal Relationships, ‘Continuous  Consent’, 
and the Law: Honest But Mistaken Judicial Beliefs” (2008) 32:2 Manitoba Law  Journal 
144 at 144 [Randall, “Sexual Assault in Spousal Relationships”].
50. Ehrlich, supra note 5 at 391, citing Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 1987).
51. Craig, “Section 276 Misconstrued”, supra note 5 at 62, discussing R v Latreille, 2005
CanLII 41547. Craig also discusses other cases involving improper admission of pat-
tern of consent evidence (at 73).
52. Randall, “Sexual Assault in Spousal Relationships”, supra note 49.
53. Grant, supra note 5.
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Overall, patterns of assumption-based reasoning and reliance on negative stereo-
types and myths in sexual assault cases continue to have an adverse impact on judi-
cial reasoning and outcomes in criminal trials. Failure to conform to the standard of 
the “ideal victim” may diminish a complainant’s credibility and open their actions 
and behaviour to greater scrutiny. The next section examines whether and to what 
extent similar patterns exist in the reasoning and outcomes of complaints of sexual 
harassment under human rights law.
Assessing Credibility and Character in Sexual Harassment 
Complaints at the BCHRT from 2010 to 2016
As mentioned in the introduction, this article draws on a case analysis of sexual harass-
ment complaints under section 13 (employment discrimination) of the BC  Human 
Rights Code from 2010 to 2016.
54
 Eighteen substantive decisions on the merits were 
identified, with fifteen producing substantive reasons in the adjudication of the com-
plaint.
55
 Eleven of those fifteen complaints were found justified, while four were dis-
missed.
56
 Two further cases were dismissed preliminarily for substantive reasons.
57
Certain trends were evident in the cases. For example, in all but one case, the 
complainants were female and the individual respondents were male.
58
 In thirteen of 
the fifteen decisions where information on the employment relationship between the 
complainant and respondent was available, the individual respondent held a position 
of authority over the female complainant in the workplace.
59
 The occupations held by 
54. Human Rights Code, supra note 13.
55. Three cases were dismissed because the complainant did not attend the hearing. Hey­
man, supra note 13; LaBelle, supra note 13; Skorka, supra note 13.
56. Kang, supra note 13; Sleightholm, supra note 13; Wideman, supra note 13; Kuchta,
supra note 13. Regardless of the outcome of the complaint, it is valuable to analyze the
ways in which assumption-based reasoning and stereotypes nonetheless arise in the rec-
itation of facts and analysis of the complaint. Ruparelia discusses this issue in the sexual 
assault context: “Even when courts have correctly applied Ewanchuk and rendered con-
victions, stereotypical assumptions continue to inform the discussion for many judges.”
Ruparelia, supra note 45 at 170.
57. Kafer, supra note 13; Woods, supra note 13.
58. Heyman, supra note 13, involved a complaint by a male employee but was dismissed as
the employee did not attend the hearing. Identity characteristics that would facilitate an
intersectional analysis of complaints (such as race, ethnicity, age, and others) were not
consistently reported in the decisions. Thus, although discrimination is often intersec-
tional in nature, the analysis of the complaints forming the basis of this article is limited to 
the consistently identified ground of discrimination as being the sex of the complainant.
59. Soroka, supra note 13, and Ratzlaff, supra note 13, were complaints brought against
co-workers. The other cases involved complaints brought against employers or
supervisors.
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the complainants tended to reflect historical patterns of sex inequality in the labour 
market, such as occupying subordinate or assistant-type roles in office settings or 
roles in historically male-dominated workplaces, such as construction.
60
 Finally, the 
conduct at issue ranged from verbal innuendo to physical touching. Seven of the 
eleven justified complaints involved physical touching, such as slapping or pinching 
a complainant’s bottom, grabbing a complainant, kissing, hugging, and touching a 
complainant’s breasts.
61
 In five of the identified complaints, sexual invitations or 
propositions were made by the respondent.
62
 Verbal conduct also included sexual 
innuendo and jokes as well as demeaning and denigrating comments related to the 
complainant’s sex.
63
In many of the identified cases, the complainant, and her version of events, was 
believed. Tribunal members in such cases often did not discuss the “unwelcome” 
requirement at length, simply stating after a summary of the relevant facts that the 
conduct in question constituted sexual harassment.
64
 However, these cases also 
tended to involve blatant forms of sexual harassment, such as unwanted physi-
cal touching.
65
 A number of cases illustrate the attentiveness and sensitivity that 
tribunal members have towards the question of consent and the “unwelcome” 
requirement in assessing complaints of sexual harassment involving more covert 
or subtle conduct. However, this is far from uniform, and several complaints, 
both dismissed and justified, illustrate the pervasive problems attending cred-
ibility assessments, character, and consent in establishing sexual harassment 
complaints. These cases relate directly to the continued presence of stereotypes 
and myths discussed earlier: (1) the implicit requirement of protest by the com-
plainant (the “hue and cry” stereotype) in establishing a harasser’s conduct as 
“unwelcome”; (2) problems arising from apparent “participation” of complain-
ants in similar or “risky” behaviour or interactions in the workplace; and (3) the 
difficulty tribunals have in assessing credibility and consent in intimate partner 
and other close relationships.
60. See Hastie, supra note 4, for a more detailed discussion of the occupations and indus-
tries present in the case set.
61. Ratzlaff, supra note 13; Tyler, supra note 13; Q, supra note 13; Root, supra note 13;
Paananen, supra note 13; Young, supra note 13; PN, supra note 13.
62. Ratzlaff, supra note 13; Tyler, supra note 13; Soroka, supra note 13; McIntosh, supra
note 13; Q, supra note 13.
63. Regarding demeaning comments, see especially MacDonald, supra note 13, and
Balikama, supra note 13. For a more detailed analysis of the conduct at issue in the
cases, see Hastie, supra note 4.
64. See e.g. Ratzlaff, supra note 13; Soroka, supra note 13; Young, supra note 13; Root,
supra note 13; Paananen, supra note 13; PN, supra note 13.
65. Ibid. Note that Soroka involved sexual invitations and propositions (“quid pro quo”
harassment).
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Protest as a Performance of Unwelcome­ness 
in Sexual Harassment Complaints
As discussed earlier, the “hue and cry” stereotype associates “real victimhood” with 
individuals that actively protest and report sexual violence or harassment in a timely 
manner. This stereotype is problematic because it neglects the broader social stigma 
and complex reasons that may lead a complainant to delay reporting such conduct or 
to tolerate or acquiesce to it. Yet the “unwelcome” requirement can function to priv-
ilege active protest as a proxy for establishing that element of the complaint. This, 
in turn, may result in many complaints being dismissed on the basis that the harasser 
did not know the conduct was “unwelcome” given the lack of protest on the part of 
the complainant.
66
 While adjudicators in many cases properly understood that a lack 
of protest does not mean that the complainant welcomed the behaviour, and did not 
rely on evidence of clear and active protest in their reasons, the cases involving sub-
tle or less blatant conduct appear to create particular issues in this regard.
Several cases found the respondent’s conduct “unwelcome” in the absence of 
explicit protest. In Q v Wild Log Homes, the complainant worked as a bookkeeper 
and administrator for the personal respondent and his company. She brought a com-
plaint of sexual harassment against the respondent on the basis of several instances 
of unwanted physical touching as well as instances of verbal harassment, including 
sexual innuendo, comments, and romantic invitations.
67
 In her analysis, the tribunal 
member noted that the complainant’s lack of protest to the first instance of physical 
touching was “consistent with the unexpected nature of the contact and its marked 
incongruence with appropriate workplace conduct.”
68
 Despite Q.’s silence at the 
time of the initial incident, this did not “change the nature of this interaction.”
69
This affirms the statement in Mahmoodi v UBC and Dutton that the “unwelcome” 
requirement does not impose an obligation on a complainant to actively or verbally 
protest.
70
 While the tribunal member goes on to find that Q. did begin to protest the 
respondent’s conduct, she also noted in her analysis that “any reasonable person 
would have known that such conduct in the work environment, absent explicit con­
sent, would be unwelcome.”
71
 The harassment in this case did relate to unwanted 
physical touching, a particularly blatant recognized form of sexual harassment.
66. Faraday, supra note 3 at 45. For a critique of the “unwelcome” requirement and how
it invites scrutiny based on whether a complainant expressly protested or objected to
conduct, see Benedet, “Book Review”, supra note 16 at 847.
67. Q, supra note 13 at paras 62–112 (summary of evidence), 138 (summary of the com-
plainant’s specific allegations of sexual harassment).
68. Ibid at para 144.
69. Ibid.
70. Mahmoodi, supra note 15.
71. Ibid at para 145 [emphasis added].
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Several cases involving verbal sexual harassment interpreted and applied the 
“unwelcome” requirement in a manner that did not punish the complainant for a lack 
of active protest. In Tyler v Robnik and Mobility World (No 2), the respondent made 
several offers for the complainant to come to his hotel room, in addition to at least 
one instance of unwanted touching and several other instances of verbal innuendo.
72
In assessing conflicting versions of events from the complainant and respondent on 
the matter of the hotel room key offers, the tribunal member stated: “It is difficult to 
imagine how Mr. Robnik, Mobility’s district manager, offering his hotel room key 
to a subordinate female employee could be viewed simply as a joke.”
73
 Although 
not explicitly connected to the “unwelcome” requirement, this statement evidences 
an understanding that, on an objective basis, a reasonable person would know that 
such conduct would be unwelcome in a work environment and between a superior 
and subordinate employee. It is, in other words, contrary to contemporary norms and 
expectations governing workplace conduct.
In Balikama Obo Others v Khaira Enterprises and Others, when assessing whether 
a manager’s misogynist language and leering were “unwelcome,” the tribunal mem-
ber noted: “[T]hese activities were such that, in today’s environment, it should not 
be necessary to articulate that such conduct is unwelcome.”
74
 In other words, the 
kind of language and conduct engaged in by the respondent in this case was clearly 
understood by the tribunal member to constitute, on an objective basis, “unwelcome” 
sexual harassment. Another example can be seen in  MacDonald v Najafi where the 
tribunal member found that, “in spite of [the complainant’s] silence, or her attempt 
to deflect the behaviour with humour, a reasonable person in Mr. Najafi’s position 
should have known that his conduct was unwelcome.”
75
 The conduct here was exclu-
sively verbal and not always overtly sexual.
These examples help establish that contemporary norms and expectations con-
cerning sexual conduct in the workplace can be understood and properly captured 
by the existing legal principles. Particularly, where physical touching is involved, it 
may be readily understood that such conduct is not welcome in the workplace and 
that the expectation is that individuals will not touch their co-workers or employees 
(rather than the expectation being on the woman to communicate her desire not 
to be touched).
76
 However, for cases involving subtle and non-physical forms of 
sexual harassment, establishing that conduct was “unwelcome” may require a com-
plainant to demonstrate protest or disapproval, thus shifting the obligation of ensur-
ing appropriate workplace interactions to women. In these cases, a lack of active 
protest or objection to conduct impacted the determination of whether the conduct 
was “unwelcome.”
72. Tyler, supra note 13 at paras 9–17.
73. Ibid at para 49.
74. Balikama, supra note 13 at para 611.
75. MacDonald, supra note 13 at para 66.
76. See e.g. Gallivan, supra note 3 at 40.
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In Sleightholm v Metrin, the tribunal member found that conduct such as hug-
ging, blowing kisses, and discussing dreams were normal in this workplace because 
they were “not protested by [the complainant] or any other employee.”
77
 Although 
not framed in relation to the “unwelcome” requirement, a lack of protest is used to 
normalize workplace conduct that might otherwise be considered “unwelcome” and 
harassing. The complaint in Sleightholm revolved particularly around the individual 
respondent sharing a dream he had about the complainant in the bath.
78
 Taking the 
workplace culture and environment as an apparently neutral background, the tribu-
nal member found that this was not sexual harassment in this workplace, despite the 
fact that it might have been considered so in another workplace.
79
 While the sharing 
of dreams, generally, may be normal conduct in this workplace, this ought not be 
used to suggest that any type or subject matter of dreams may be shared.
Stereotypes about “ideal victims” and how they should react to unwanted sexu-
alized conduct can even be found in cases involving unwanted physical touching. In 
Woods v Fluid Creations, the tribunal member did not find the complainant’s testi-
mony to be credible, based partly on her response and reaction following the alleged 
conduct: “[T]he Complainant’s assertion that she did not protest because she was 
a probationary employee does not explain why she said nothing to any co-worker. 
This alleged meekness seems inconsistent with the statement in her affidavit that she 
‘spun around to face [Mr. McPhee] about to freak out on him and tell him off.’”
80
The statements made in the above quote illustrate concerns about an underlying reli-
ance on the “hue and cry” stereotype as well as gendered ideas of victimhood. The 
reasoning evidences certain beliefs about how a victim would react and betrays a 
misunderstanding of victim psychology, economic anxieties, and workplace dynam-
ics commonly documented in similar scenarios.
81
 An “ideal victim” is a “(re)action 
hero” and would have immediately made her discomfort clear; since the complainant 
did not do this, her conduct is scrutinized and her lack of protest, or performance, as 
such, negatively impacts the reasoning and outcome in this case.
82
Overall, these cases illustrate the ways in which underlying beliefs and stereotypes 
about the performance of victimhood can negatively impact the credibility of a com-
plainant, the assessment of “unwelcome” conduct, and, in some cases, the outcome 
of the complaint itself, despite the fact that the legal principles explicitly acknowl-
edge that active protest is not a requirement of establishing “unwelcome” conduct. 
77. Sleightholm, supra note 13 at para 73.
78. Ibid at para 20.
79. Ibid at para 56.
80. Woods, supra note 13 at para 50.
81. Matulewicz, “Law’s Gendered Subtext”, supra note 37 at 128; Abrams, supra note 27
at 1222; Faraday, supra note 3 at 45.
82. Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”, supra note 5 at 879, citing a concept out-
lined in Rachel Hall, “‘It Can Happen to You’: Rape Prevention in the Age of Risk
Management” (2004) 19:3 Hypatia 1 at 6.
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While some complainants may be able to establish the kind of assertive and explicit 
objection or protest sought by adjudicators, economic disincentives, gendered hier-
archies in the workplace, and other motivations may dissuade many more complain-
ants from actively protesting or reporting sexually harassing conduct.
83
 However, to 
borrow from Ruparelia, it seems that “no ‘no’” may risk an interpretation that the 
conduct was not “unwelcome” in sexual harassment complaints, especially where 
the harassment is verbal in nature and the workplace normalizes such conduct.
84
“Risky” Behaviour as Participation and Performativity 
of Welcome­ness: Less­than­Ideal Complainants in Sexual 
Harassment Complaints
Several cases problematically conflated workplace dynamics and particular 
 behaviours of a complainant with welcoming conduct that might otherwise be char-
acterized as harassment. This illustrates the wider problems that character evidence 
can have in associating individuals who engage in “risky” behaviour as therefore 
likely to consent to other interactions or behaviours. These cases also, in some 
instances, communicate problematic beliefs about women’s sexual prowess and 
frame the complainant as a seductress.
85
 For example, in Kafer v Sleep Country Can­
ada and Another (No 2), the tribunal member dismissed the case on the basis that 
there was no reasonable prospect of the complainant proving the conduct in question 
was “unwelcome” because, on occasion, she had previously participated in sexual 
banter in the workplace.
86
 The tribunal member noted that in most cases the conduct 
at issue would be deemed “unwelcome” but that the complainant’s prior participation 
made it unclear whether the conduct would be “unwelcome” in this situation.
87
 This 
problematically shifts the burden of responsibility to the complainant and works to 
excuse harassing conduct on the basis of her own “risky” behaviour.
88
 By having pre-
viously participated in sexual banter in the workplace, she places herself outside the 
bounds of “ideal victimhood” and disentitles herself to legal protection, regardless 
of whether the gravity of the conduct in issue exceeds that of the conduct in which 
she participated. This could be taken to suggest that an employee waives their right 
to complain if they have participated in conduct of a similar nature, if not degree, at 
some time before the alleged incident. In this way, this less-than-ideal complainant 
83. See e.g. Abrams, supra note 27 at 1222.
84. Ruparelia, supra note 45 at 171.
85. These kinds of stereotypes and myths were similarly found by Hart, supra note 3. Hart
discusses Saskatchewan and SGEU (Lessard) (Re) (2001), 99 LAC (4th) 412 (at 276).
86. Kafer, supra note 13 at paras 34, 37.
87. Ibid at para 39.
88. Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra note 5 at 37.
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has her complaint judged not on the harasser’s conduct but, rather, on her own past 
behaviour or character. Participation in related past conduct thus similarly raises the 
bar of what is required to establish “unwelcomeness,” as discussed earlier. A com-
plainant in such contexts may be expected to actively and clearly protest further 
conduct in order to establish that it is “unwelcome,” requiring vulnerable workers 
to “draw the line” in determining whether or not something is sexual harassment.
89
Kang v Hill and Another (No 2) provides another example of the problems for com-
plainants who appear to participate in or encourage the conduct in question. The com-
plainant, Ms. Kang, alleged sexual harassment by her employer, Mr. Hill, related to 
several instances where he communicated romantic feelings to her. The tribunal mem-
ber found that her claim was not justified due in part to the fact that she “engaged” the 
respondent in conversations about these feelings rather than outright rejecting them.
90
 
Further, the tribunal member in this case found that Ms. Kang in fact wielded power 
over her employer, by virtue of his admitted feelings for her.
91
 This commentary bears 
implicit connection to the myth of women’s power of seductress and neglects the 
power dynamics attending the workplace and the role of Mr. Hill as the employer in 
this situation. Although the tribunal member does formally acknowledge Mr. Hill’s 
position of authority over Ms. Kang, Ms. Kang’s participation in dialogue regarding 
Mr. Hill’s feelings is used to undermine the notion that this power imbalance was a 
meaningful factor and to dismiss the claim that Ms. Kang feared job-related conse-
quences.
92
 The tribunal member’s analysis in this case further supports heteronor-
mative assumptions about gender dynamics and relations, where “the legal system 
affirms that it is ‘natural’ for men to make sexual advances to women, and that the 
onus is on women to indicate, after the fact, that this sexual attention is unwanted.”
93
 
Despite acknowledging that Mr. Hill’s advances were “sudden” and “irrational,” they 
also appeared to be, at least to a degree, excused by the tribunal member.
94
The parallels to sexual assault and criminal harassment are clear: because a nar-
row conception of victimhood is privileged, responses to harassment that deviate 
from that conception are treated with suspicion by adjudicators rather than being 
89. Matulewicz, “Law’s Gendered Subtext”, supra note 37 at 132. See also Gallivan, supra
note 3 at 47, discussing the problematic consequences of past participation as equivo-
cal to full and future consent in Daigle v Hunter (1988), 10 CHRR D/5670 (NBHRC).
90. Kang, supra note 13 at paras 50–51.
91. Ibid at para 53. Mr. Hill’s communication of his feelings to Ms. Kang was described as
“an acknowledgment of his weakness” by the Tribunal member, further supporting a
problematic interpretation that this “to some degree placed him under her power, rather 
than the other way around.” Ibid at para 52.
92. Ibid at paras 50–53.
93. Faraday, supra note 3 at 44. Similar assumptions and problematic reasoning exist in
relation to sexual assault trials in criminal law. See e.g. Craig, Putting Trials on Trial,
supra note 5 at 201.
94. Kang, supra note 13 at para 51.
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considered as avoidance or coping strategies.
95
 In Kang, the tribunal member side-
steps the complainant’s sense of financial jeopardy, saying that the respondent had 
“said or done nothing to suggest objectively that her job was at risk.”
96
 This, coupled 
with Ms. Kang’s own behaviour, led the tribunal member to conclude that Ms. Kang 
did not have a fear for her continued employment or of job-related consequences.
97
This reflects a narrow understanding of complainant behaviour that “assume[s] that 
there is one standard response to fear, and that departures from that standard are fatal 
to successful prosecution.”
98
 This perspective further influenced the conclusion that 
Mr. Hill had not asserted economic or sexual power over Ms. Kang and a suggestion 
that, if anything, she had asserted power over him.
99
Complicating the “Unwelcome” Requirement and Its Application 
in the Context of Intimate Partner and Close Relationships
Cases involving current or former intimate partners appear to pose particular prob-
lems for adjudicators in assessing credibility and consent. In addition, where there 
are relationships that are “familial”-like relationships of intimacy or closeness, 
 adjudicators may have difficulty understanding the nature and impact of the conduct 
at issue. These issues are illustrated most clearly in two cases: McIntosh v Metro 
 Aluminum Products and Another (concerning intimate partners) and Wideman v 
Wiebe (concerning “analogous” relationships).
In McIntosh, the complainant alleged that she was subject to ongoing sexual 
harassment by the individual respondent, Mr. Augustynowicz, in the form of per-
sistent text messages for a period of three months, which ultimately caused her 
to leave her position.
100
 Ms. McIntosh and Mr. Augustynowicz had engaged in 
a consensual sexual relationship prior to the time period during which she was 
sexually harassed.
101
 Mr. Augustynowicz claimed that Ms. McIntosh had “con-
sented to, and participated in, all such communications, and that she sent similar 
95. For a discussion of alternate ways of interpreting the “unwelcome” requirement that
would “reflect the constraints under which many sexual harassment victims operate”
by acknowledging the multiple coping mechanisms and strategies that might be de-
ployed in an effort to resist or demonstrate unwelcomeness short of express verbal
objection, such as “changing the subject in conversation and attempting to avoid the
perpetrator[,]” see Abrams, supra note 27 at 1222. In the context of sexual assault, see
also Randall, “Ideal Victims”, supra note 5 at 421.
96. Kang, supra note 13 at para 51.
97. Ibid at para 51.
98. Grant, supra note 5 at 579.
99. Kang, supra note 13 at paras 52–53.
100. McIntosh, supra note 13 at para 1.
101. Ibid at para 3.
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text messages” to him.
102
 The respondent’s argument thus primarily rested on 
establishing that the complainant was a “willing participant.” Ms. McIntosh tes-
tified to multiple strategies she attempted to use to stop the harassing conduct, 
including telling Mr. Augustynowicz to stop sending text messages, ignoring 
him, “being mean back to him,” and pretending she had another boyfriend.
103
In cross-examination, Ms. McIntosh’s engagement with the text messages was 
further questioned by the respondent in an apparent attempt to establish that, if 
the conduct was “unwelcome,” she simply could have deleted the text messages 
without reading them.
104
In her analysis, the tribunal member framed the issue as centrally concerned with 
whether the conduct in question was “unwelcome,” given the blatant sexual content 
of the text messages.
105
 In addition to individual testimony, the tribunal member 
had a forensic report including some of the text messages admitted as evidence to 
consider, which may have positively impacted her findings of fact and analysis.
106
In addressing the respondent’s argument that the complainant was a willing partici-
pant, the tribunal member found that Ms. McIntosh had clearly communicated that 
she wished him to stop the conduct, both verbally and through text messages.
107
Thus, the complainant performed the characteristics of “cautious femininity” and 
risk aversion by being clear about her desire not to be harassed, which conform to 
certain expectations about victim behaviour.
108
In responding to the specific argument made by the respondent that Ms. McIntosh 
should have simply deleted the texts without opening them, the tribunal member 
noted: “It was not up to Ms. McIntosh to refuse to open her texts and risk retaliation 
from her employer. It was Mr. Augustynowicz’s responsibility not to sexually harass 
his employee.”
109
 Through this statement, the tribunal member clearly acknowl-
edged the power dynamic of the parties’ relationship, the impact this would have 
on their interactions and conduct, and the fact that the expectations and obligations 
to avoid harassment lay with the employer. The tribunal member further understood 
Ms. McIntosh’s apparent engagement with the text messages as strategies deployed 
in an attempt to stop the harassing conduct.
110
However, in considering the parties’ prior relationship, the tribunal member 
found that this had created an obligation on Ms. McIntosh to “clearly and expressly 
advise [the respondent] that the relationship was over and that she no longer wishes 
102. Ibid at para 2.
103. Ibid at paras 32–33, 43–45, 51.
104. Ibid at para 59.
105. Ibid at para 104.
106. Ibid at paras 36–42.
107. Ibid at para 113.
108. Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”, supra note 5 at 878.
109. McIntosh, supra note 13 at para 127.
110. Ibid at para 117, 124–28.
82 Hastie CJWL/RFD
to engage in sexual communications.”
111
 While, in this case, Ms. McIntosh could 
establish that she had done so, this statement has the effect of creating a higher bar for 
complainants who have a history of sexual or romantic relations with their harasser. 
The tribunal member makes it clear that former partners must meet a more stringent 
test (by expressly protesting).
112
 In other words, where intimate partners are con-
cerned, active protest and communication that the conduct is unwelcome appears 
to be required. This directly contradicts the reasoning and principles stated in Mah­
moodi and creates a heightened burden for complainants to both communicate disap-
proval or protest and establish as much in a legal proceeding.
113
 This creates a default 
position for prior intimate partner relationships that sexual conduct is welcome unless 
a woman communicates otherwise and enables the importation of problematic con-
cepts related to “patterns of consent” critiqued in the sexual assault context.
114
In a more subtle fashion, similar problems can arise where a complainant and 
respondent have a closer relationship than typical in the workplace; adjudicators 
can similarly misconstrue a relationship of imbalanced power and harassment as 
one of intimacy or closeness. This is illustrated in the decision in Wideman v Wiebe. 
In Wideman, allegations concerning sexual harassment arose in the context of the 
complainant’s former employment at Community Builders. Early in her analysis, 
the  tribunal member characterizes Community Builders as an “unusual workplace” 
where “the relational approach to tenant support required very close contact and 
communication between staff, management and tenants.”
115
 Within this context, the 
relationship between the complainant, Ms. Wideman, and the respondent, Mr. Wiebe, 
is repeatedly cast as being a familial one.
116
The reasoning in Wideman evidences a reliance on notions of “the family” to 
colour the character of the conduct, as has been done in the context of intimate part-
ner sexual assault. For example, the tribunal member states that she does not “think 
it ‘in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities’ that Mr. Wiebe would have 
become sexually fixated on and jealous of Ms. Wideman while at the same time 
encouraging her ongoing involvement with his immediate and extended family.”
117
It appears that an inference with regard to whether the conduct was in fact harass-
ment is being drawn on the basis of an assumption that harassment would not be 
carried out in a “familial”-like context; this bears links to the “real rape” stereotype, 
discussed earlier, that assumes sexual assault is only committed by strangers, not by 
individuals with whom a victim would have an ongoing relationship.
118
111. Ibid at para 116.
112. Indeed, in McIntosh, the tribunal member later discusses the complainant’s fear of
retaliation and power imbalance between her and the respondent (at paras 132–36).
113. Mahmoodi, supra note 15 at 140.
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Although other evidence places Ms. Wideman’s credibility in doubt, the way in 
which sexual harassment is discussed, in relation to credibility, character, and con-
sent, reveals important issues for consideration. Coupled with the ways in which the 
“familial”-like context of the workplace and of Ms. Wideman’s relationship to Mr. 
Wiebe is discussed so as to potentially minimize the conduct in question, her inti-
mate relationship with an individual not employed by Community Builders is used to 
undermine her credibility. In assessing her credibility, the tribunal member states that, 
“for reasons known only to her, but which appear to be connected to her relation­
ship with the Tenant, she had historically revised her recollection of her working and 
other relationships with Mr. Wiebe and his family.”
119
 The individual with whom Ms. 
Wideman was in a relationship was further noted as having addiction issues and being 
occasionally violent.
120
 The “risky” lifestyle or behaviour of her partner thus appeared 
to play some role in assessing Ms. Wideman’s own judgment and credibility. The 
explicit connection of the complainant’s lack of credibility to her relationship with 
“the Tenant” could be seen as improperly shifting the focus of inquiry in her com-
plaint towards the propriety or prudence of her lifestyle or behaviour outside of the 
workplace. At other times, the relationship between Ms. Wideman and “the Tenant” 
is used to suggest ulterior motives, casting a wider suspicion over her credibility.
121
Overall, these cases illustrate similar difficulties to those documented in relation to 
intimate partner violence in the criminal justice system. This is particularly troubling 
given that, in the workplace, many relationships may bear analogous characteristics 
to “intimate” relationships, such as ongoing communication, social interactions, and 
others. The nature and structure of the workplace may be mistakenly taken as neutral 
ground,
122
 rather than interrogating whether and to what extent institutional culture 
may play a role in the creation or facilitation of sexual harassment in the workplace.
Conclusion
Despite successful outcomes in a majority of identified complaints of workplace 
sexual harassment at the BCHRT, a qualitative analysis of the reasoning in these 
cases illustrates that stereotypes and myths known to plague sexual assault cases 
in the criminal law context are also present in cases of sexual harassment in the 
human rights law context. These stereotypes enter the inquiry through, primarily, the 
requirement that a complainant establish that harassing conduct was “unwelcome.” 
The “unwelcome” requirement has the potential to create numerous obstacles for 
complainants and may serve to improperly shift the focus of the inquiry towards 
119. Wideman, supra note 13 at para 59 [emphasis added]. Note that “the Tenant” and
Ms. Wideman were involved in a romantic relationship during the time of the hearing.
120. Ibid at paras 43, 70.
121. Wideman, supra note 13 at para 59.
122. As could potentially be argued in relation to both Wideman, supra note 13, and
 Sleightholm, supra note 13, discussed earlier in this article.
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their own behaviour, including participation or a lack of clear objection to harassing 
conduct. This shift presents an opportunity to argue that harassing conduct was not 
“unwelcome” because of the complainant’s background, reaction, or conduct and 
inappropriately shifts the burden of responsibility to women to avoid harassment, 
operating to further entrench sex inequality in the workplace.
The legal principles governing workplace sexual harassment complaints were 
laid down initially in Janzen v Platy Enterprises in 1989. While those principles 
have been subject to interpretation, the “unwelcome” requirement continues to 
present serious problems in application. Further amendment, whether through legal 
interpretation or formal law reform, is needed. In particular, legislators and legal 
decision-makers could look to the amendments made with respect to sexual assault 
law, as documented in this article. As has been previously suggested, a reverse onus 
of proof, explicitly requiring a respondent to establish affirmative consent, may be a 
welcome addition to sexual harassment law.
123
 Relatedly, provincial Human Rights 
Commissions could publish policy and guidance documents summarizing and out-
lining factors that should be considered in establishing the “unwelcome” require-
ment, as have been laid down in existing decisions and documented in this article.
124
These would include, for example, the fact that silence on the part of a complainant 
should not be understood as consent. As both social and legal culture continue to 
work against the entrenchment of gender myths and stereotypes, it is important that 
the laws attending sexual harassment, in and outside of the workplace, keep pace.
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